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Abstract. This paper considers several aspects of natural visual attention and its 
link to wider notions of awareness, natural and artificial, in the context of 
foveated vision. It builds on a theory of abductive perception; a formal definition 
for an artificial or robot perceptual system, using objects represented as feature 
clouds. It proposes a broad, but unifying approach to several aspects of visual 
attention in the light of this, including autonomic eye gaze movements, aspects of 
secondary and covert attention, and exogenous (sense driven) and endogenous 
(task driven) attention. Modes of attentional lapse, commonly referred to as 
inattentional blindness and change blindness, are also discussed in the context of 
the model presented. 
 
1    Introduction 
This paper addresses the task of providing the groundwork for a logically formulated and 
computationally motivated model of foveal-based attention in visual perception. Notions of 
sensory attention, preferential emphasis on, or selection of, one or a few items of sensory 
information from a much larger stream of data, appear ubiquitously across the animal 
kingdom (Bushnell 1995, Zentall and Riley 2000) and it takes many forms in human 
perception. While much has already been written on the subject of human visual attention, see 
e.g. Duncan (2006), Itti and Koch (2001), Pashler (1998) or Posner and Petersen (1990) for 
general reviews across several discipline boundaries; few have sought to embed attention 
within a formal framework.  
Specifically, we develop a unifying approach to perception and visual attention, extending 
prior work in abductive perception (Shanahan 2002, Shanahan and Randell 2004, Randell and 
Witkowski 2006). We address several aspects of human visual attention in the light of this 
work, including generation of autonomic scanpaths of eye gaze movements, aspects of 
secondary and covert attention, and of exogenous (sense driven) and endogenous (task driven) 
attention. We also consider modes of inattention: change blindness and inattentional 
blindness; situations were there are apparently surprising lapses of attention.  
This paper is primarily concerned with the role of semantically meaningful objects in the 
generation of attention strategies. The notion of object-based attention has arisen in the 
literature (Duncan 1984, Kahneman et al 1992, Pylyshyn 2001, Scholl 2001). Scholl (2001) 
provides a detailed discussion of the issues involved, highlighting the difficulties in defining 
what should constitute an object relative to attention and raising the question as to whether 
notions of objects are formed pre-attentively or post-attentively. We begin with an a-priori 
notion of “object” represented as a feature cloud and argue from the model developed that 
visual attributes of such objects are processed pre-attentively and that attention is therefore a 
late-selection phenomenon (e.g. Pashler 1998). We also make a strong assumption of 
embodiment, that objects have volume and occupy physical space about the viewer. The 
world about us is naturally and unavoidably perceived in depth (where flat or iconic “objects” 
must similarly be projected to a physical surface). 
In order to address issues of attention we develop a notion of attentive preference across 
objects, defining the significance or salience of those objects to the perceiver. We also 
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role in inhibition of return (Taylor and Klein 1998) and change detection (Rensink 2002).  
We will initially consider shifts of overt visual attention. This is indicated by autonomic 
eye-gaze movements, referred to here as the scanpath (Stark and Choi 1996). We take the 
view that objects may be accurately identified and categorized only when located within the 
central foveal regions of the retinal imager, whereas, due to the reduced resolution, only 
partial identification is possible in the visual periphery.  We assume that this estimation in the 
periphery suffices to provide a “gist” (Rensink 2000) or characterisation of the overall scene, 
but that more detailed (peri-foveal) inspection is required to confirm the general identity of an 
object. Foveal inspection is also required to perform detailed tasks, such as reading normal 
sized text. We will also consider notions of secondary attention, where the observer is 
apparently cognitively aware of several visual items at once, but which will not necessarily be 
visited by the gaze-path. We also briefly consider the role of volitional gaze movements, 
secondary attention and covert attention (Horowitz et al 2006). 
In part visual attention is task or activity dependent, controlled by higher level cognitive 
processes that select what is to be viewed preferentially according to the current role 
(endogenous attention), for instance, as indicated by visual search tasks (e.g. Treisman and 
Gelade, 1980, Wolfe, 1994). It is also well established and within the human common 
experience that areas of high spatial contrast, colour saturation, and certain types of 
movement in the peripheral field will attract both gaze and attention (exogenous attention). 
Models of exogenous attention have been proposed by e.g. Itti et al (1998) and endogenous 
attention by Stark and Choi (1996). Hochstein and Ahissar (2002) present a “reverse 
hierarchical model” incorporating both aspects.  
Itti et al (1998) present a saliency-based model of exogenous (sense-driven) attention, 
which uniformly applies multi-scale feature extraction (intensity, edge orientation, colour, 
etc.) to an image. This is used to build a combined feature map. From this mapping various 
feature combinations are assigned “salience” according to the application under consideration. 
A process of competition is applied to isolate places of maximal saliency and these points are 
then visited in saliency order to emulate the process of visual attention. Once attended to, a 
temporary process of inhibition of return (IOR) suppresses the salience of the last attended 
location, so that the next most salient place is visited and so on.   
Models of task-driven processes of attention are less well represented and are generally 
incomplete. Stark and Choi (1996) present a model that emulates the eye-gaze path of a 
simulated human observer, using a Markov state model based approach. Navalpakkam and 
Itti (2002) extend the Itti and Koch model with task based relevance. Breazeal et al (2000) 
suppress or intensify attributes of the attentive feature map to reflect changing “social” drives, 
emulating some aspects of cognitive control.  
More general models of human visual and attention processes are represented by 
Rensink’s (2000) coherence theory, and Pylyshyn and Storm’s (1988) notion of FINSTs 
(fingers of instantiation), based on findings that humans can track about five visual objects, 
apparently covertly. Equally, more specific aspects of the attention process have been 
modelled also, such as the feature integration theory of Treisman & Gelade (1980) seeking to 
explain aspects of visual search. It is notable however, that while there is considerable 
evidence that many modes of attention are present there is little consensus as to which, or 
indeed whether some combination, provides the better overall explanation of the range of 
attention phenomena that may be postulated. The approach adopted here takes a broad view 
of attention, postulating mechanisms that impinge on many aspects of the overall problem. 
This paper also considers apparent lapses of “attention”, when seemingly highly 
significant or unusual objects or events in full view appear to be completely overlooked, 
where they would normally be drawn into explicit awareness by the visual attention system. 
Such lapses have been known for many years, and have often been ascribed to avoidable fault 
on the part of the observer. Such issues are, of course, of particular significance where 
potentially dangerous, possibly everyday, activities are being performed, such as driving a 
car, riding a motorcycle or flying an aircraft. 
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highly repeatable phenomena, and depend on the circumstances the observer is in. They can 
be placed into (at least) two distinct categories: Inattentional Blindness (Mack and Rock 
1998, Simons and Chabris 1999, Most et al 2000) and Change Blindness (Levin and Simons 
1997, Simons and Levin 1998, Simons et al 2000; Rensink 2002 for review).   
Our interest arises from the use of formally defined models of perception and attention 
models in a cognitive robotics context, applying observations about human and natural 
perception to robotics within a formal framework. The formal model of perception described 
in this paper builds on and adapts the feature cloud representation of visual objects of Randell 
and Witkowski (2006), itself an extension of a scheme of abductive perception proposed by 
Shanahan (2002) and developed in Shanahan and Randell (2004). Both use a logical language 
expressed in first-order predicate logic to describe the physical objects in a robot’s world and 
specifically the consequence of the world interacting with the robot’s sensors. The primary 
purpose of this paper is not to extend the formalization previously given, but rather to apply 
the formal model to investigate and discuss aspects of attention. We retain elements of the 
notation to illustrate the approach but rely on textual descriptions whenever possible. Several 
aspects of the description call on vision processing techniques properly the domain of 
computer vision and we identify these where appropriate. Other robot motivated models of 
attention in perception have been proposed by, for example, Aziz et al (2006), Breazeal et al 
(2000), Khadhouri and Demiris (2005), and Vieira Neto and Nehmzow 2005. 
In our model, objects in the world – and their sub-parts – are encapsulated in a hierarchical 
(qualitative) symbolic description, coupled to a (quantitative) vector based representation 
embedded within that symbolic description. Vectors determine the relative positions of every 
part of the object. Lower nodes in this hierarchy, features, are matched directly with the 
visual characteristics of the object or surface at a place in the visual field. Features form the 
link between the symbolic object description and the sensing mechanism. It is recognized that 
the characteristics at a single place on the surface of an object (giving rise to the feature 
description when impinging on the sensor) may vary according to viewing conditions, notably 
the distance and angle at which the feature is viewed. Each feature is further mapped to a 
(non-empty) set of terminal appearance nodes, each mapping directly to a specific sensor 
detector state. Detectors are tuned to respond to specific patterns in the visual field. The 
vectors embedded in each of the appearance node descriptions provides an estimate of the 
relative pose of the feature, and so may be used to infer the approximate pose of the whole 
object relative to the current viewpoint.  
This paper assumes a foveal visual system, figure 1 (left). In the peripheral area, features 
are identified with a low spatial resolution (equating to low spatial frequency distribution). 
Only within the area of the fovea are features detected with a high resolution. Some angular 
portion of the visual field is given over to the central foveal area, denoted r in figure 1, 
equivalent to the singer figurine’s face (r is approximately 15º in the human visual field, but 
may be set arbitrarily in the model). In addition, the human eye has a smaller area (about 1.5º) 
of greatly increased resolution, the fovea centralis (r’ in figure 1) One task of any attention 
mechanism is to direct the gaze so that the foveal area is centred on the area of current 
interest. This has been likened to a spotlight, preferentially “illuminating” areas of heightened 
interest (Itti and Koch, 2001). Eye-gaze movements may therefore be seen as a strong 
indicator of both the choice and ordering of targets selected for visual attention when viewing 
a scene. Equally, this selection should not be directly equated with notions of visual or 
attentional awareness; a person may look directly at a target object apparently without it 
being registered by or materially affecting any cognitive process.  
 3 On eye-gaze scanpaths 
Human eye-gaze is not a smooth track, but normally proceeds in a series of rapid eyeball 
motions, saccades, interspersed with periods of relative stability, fixations
1. The motion of the 
eye during each saccade is essentially ballistic, a planned movement to a pre-determined 
place, which can achieve a rotational speed of 600º/sec. or more (Becker 1991). Saccades are 
also accompanied by rotation of the head if they would exceed 15-20º. Fixations typically last 
200-400ms. It is generally considered that perception only occurs during fixations and is 
suppressed during each saccade (as well as during blinks) to give an illusion of constant 
vision (but see Brockmole et al 2002 for a detailed discussion). Eye-gaze motions are easily 
measured (Duchowski 2003). Figure 1 (right) shows a human eye-gaze trace for an example 
image (23 seconds). Fixations are shown with an ‘F’. The gaze trace in figure 1 (right) was 
recorded with our LC Technologies, Inc. (www.eyegaze.com) eye-gaze tracking system. 
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Figure 1: Simulated foveal area (top-left); human eye-gaze path (top-right and below) 
 
Autonomic scanpaths display a characteristic, if variable, pattern (Hayhoe and Ballard 
2005, Henderson 2003, Just and Carpenter 1976, Kowler et al 1995, Noton and Stark 1971, 
Rao et al 1997, Stark and Choi 1996, Torralba et al 2006). When presented with a variety of 
static image types, the visual search performed is highly selective on the image surface and 
gaze scans around a number of selected locations in rapid succession (e.g. Yarbus 1967), for 
example, figure 1, bottom left, 0.0-4.1 seconds. There is no systematic search over the entire 
image field (unless the observer is engaged in some task that requires this, such as reading 
text). Instead, a limited number of selected, apparently salient, places of the image are visited 
in turn. These locations most likely correspond to objects of significance within the image 
(we return to notions of significance later).  
Then, typically, the path is repeated, often in the same or similar order (figure 1, bottom, 
middle, 4.1-10.9 seconds. As the viewing progresses these places are re-visited frequently, 
though new areas of interest may be introduced. There is no discernable overall tendency to 
minimize the scanpath, long saccades being interspersed with short ones. During the scanpath 
period, some areas, particularly faces, are selected for detailed inspection (figure 1, bottom 
right, detail, 5.9-8.9s). It has been long established that the overall pattern of the scanpath can 
be substantially modified according to tasks set the observer (Yarbus 1967) and that the 
                                                      
1 There are other modes of eye movement as well, such as pursuit, in which the gaze follows a moving 
target and nystagmus, which compensates for observer motion (e.g. Tatler and Wade 2002).  
 4 modification is seemingly instantaneous once the task is established (but see Hodgson et al 
2004 for a detailed investigation). Sun and Fisher (2003) present a scanpath emulation based 
on colour segmentation at multiple levels of resolution; Rao et al (1997) emulate scanpath 
search strategies; Lee and Yu (1999) take an information theoretic approach; Torralba et al 
(2006) consider how object context and location affect the scanpath.  
Visual attention, in this limited sense, is largely continuous – the gaze shifts continue 
throughout periods of normal vision. We take the eye gaze scanpath only as an indicator of 
visual attention (see also Hoffman 1998). Visual attention is not, however, to be taken as 
synonymous with cognition or awareness – it is not an end in itself. It is clear that visual 
attention impinges on and modifies awareness; equally it is clear that cognitive processes can 
prime and direct the visual attention mechanism according to tasks. Within the visual field a 
number of other, non-foveal, items may also be brought into partial cognitive awareness 
(covert or fringe awareness) and these may in turn become candidates for subsequent foveal 
visits (Horowitz et al 2006).  
It should also be noted that the visual (and sensory) component of attention accounts for 
only a proportion of human awareness, which is directed to different aspects of mental 
activity throughout the day on a continuing basis (James 1890, Hurlburt et al 2002). 
Paper outline 
Section 2 describes the background to and the principles behind the theory of abductive 
perception, which forms the underlying rationale for the pre-attentive perceptual process. 
Section 3 provides a formal definition and accompanying description of the feature cloud 
volumetric object representation, which bridges detectable sensor items (features and their 
appearances) to conceptual object types. Section 4 considers the necessary properties for 
feature (sensor) detectors within the formalism. Section 5 describes the essential properties of 
the panorama structure, which records object information in a robot-centric representation, 
acting as a (combined) transient visual buffer and conceptual memory, managing, among 
other things, the information required for inhibition of return. Section 6 describes the pre-
attentive perceptual process, matching sensor items to form object hypotheses. Section 7 
describes the attentional process model, covering the use of preference ordering to give and 
maintain attentive salience over objects and the role of salience partitions (7.1), the 
underlying scanpath cycle, incorporating the perceptual cycle (7.2) and the management of 
preferences (7.3). Section 8 discusses each of the identified attention modes in terms of 
attentional preference ordering and partitioning, inhibition of return, detector input and task 
relevance. Section 9 considers how these aspects contribute to inattentional phenomena. 
Appendix 1 gives a formal definition of preference and appendix 2 provides definitions of the 
three measures that regulate the pre-attentive perceptual process. 
2   Theory of Abductive Perception 
The treatment of perception and attention developed here exploits a mode of inference known 
as abduction. This works from a set of observations and generates a set of alternative 
conjectures, that if true would best explain the observations. As expected, and implied here, 
the set of alternative explanations generated are rarely unique, an additional framework is 
needed to interrogate and test these conjectures and select those that best explain the available 
evidence.  
To this end we adopt a hypothetico-deductive model, where, when given a set of possible 
explanatory hypotheses via abduction, the set of predictions that follow are then used to prune 
the hypothesis space, according to how well the predictions are confirmed (or refuted) when 
compared to the original sensor data. The abductive perception approach models visual 
perception as a combination of bottom-up, sense driven, and top-down, expectation driven 
processes. As such it accords well with a substantial body of empirical and experimental data 
from visual psychophysics (e.g. Rock 1981) and from neurophysiological evidence of a two-
way flow of information (e.g. Hochstein and Ahissar 2002, Lee and Mumford 2003) and 
 5 whose roots may be traced to the mid-19
th century (Helmholtz 1865). The approach is also 
related to that of active perception (Aloimonos et al 1987, Ballard 1991). 
The formal model assumed here is an extension of that proposed by Shanahan (2002). 
Here we use a logical language expressed in first-order predicate logic to describe the visual 
world. The language is used to construct sets of sentences that describe the given background 
theory (Σ), the interpreted sensor data (Γ ), and the set of abduced hypotheses that, if true, 
explain that sensor data (Δ). Formally, this is woven together and represented by the logical 
schema: Σ ∪ Δ |= Γ, which states that Γ is a logical consequence of Σ and Δ. Hence, given Γ 
and Σ, we construct Δ (by abduction), and then use deduction to test the consequences of 
those hypotheses (using the hypothetico-deductive model). Within the logic, all sentences 
take the form of well-formed formulae (wffs), sequences of symbols adhering to the formation 
rules (syntax) of the language and where Greek upper-case letters are used to indicate sets of 
sentences (e.g. Σ, Δ and Γ ). 
We define and factor out particular subsets of sentences in Σ and Δ as follows. First Σ 
(being the background theory) is separated out into (i) the generic descriptions of objects 
(encoded as feature clouds) which we call Σo, and (ii) sets of constraints, such as those 
embodying various commonsense properties of the world (Σc). Amongst these are the 
“commonsense” beliefs that two volumetric bodies may abut but not overlap (i.e. they may 
not share a volume in common) and that an opaque body occludes from view anything 
directly behind it from a viewpoint. Similarly, Δ is divided into (i) the set of alternative 
interpretations of the world (Δh), (ii) the currently single preferred explanation (Δi), and (iii) 
Δp, which is the current robot-centric description of the world.  
In order to measure how well generated hypotheses explain the data, a set of numerical 
measures are introduced. These include a distinctiveness value (dv) that measures the rarity 
value of individual features encoded in Σ, an explanatory value (ev) that measures how well a 
hypothesized object of a given predicted position and pose matches the sensor data, and a 
rank ordering (ro) that ranks the likelihood that a particular object type explains the sensor 
data. These measures are defined formally in appendix 2. 
The feature cloud model encapsulates both symbolic and numerical information. The 
former allows us to exploit established symbolic automated reasoning methods (both for 
abduction and deduction) while the latter mirrors these operations in the application of linear 
transformations on sets of vectors encoded in our 3D model descriptions. 
The new abductive strategy for processing sensor data is illustrated in overview in figure 2 
and proceeds as follows. Firstly, detectors operating on the image plane (the field of view, 
FOV, denoted ABCD in the lower part of the figure) identify and extract features (from their 
appearances) and these populate the sensor data structure Γ. Next, distinctive elements of the 
sensor stream are matched to object descriptions in Σo to generate a set of candidate 
hypotheses in a hypothesized space Δh that may explain the sensor data (shown in the upper 
part of figure 2. Based on this partial evidence, each inferred host-object is hypothesized to 
occupy a specific place in the space about the robot. Then using deduction coupled with the 
manipulation of 3D linear-transforms (as prediction) the ramifications of this projection are 
expanded. The feature cloud is used to determine the expectations of other features associated 
with the hypothesized object(s) in question. The sensor data is then re-consulted to refine the 
explanatory value by determining the extent to which each hypothesis is supported by the 
observed data; these are represented by short left facing arrows in the upper part of the figure. 
On the basis of this, hypotheses with low explanatory value are rejected (and sensor data 
items they would have explained are released, though still in need of an explanation). The 
process is repeated until all the sensor data elements of Γ have a coherent explanation, and 
where all the ground hypotheses in Δ satisfy all the constraints applicable to the domain. This 
sequence of events is revisited in section 6. 
A cognitive agent cannot deny or disprove sensor data, it can only interpret it in a manner 
consistent with the use it intends to make of the data. Where no coherent explanation can be 
found for the sensor data, the agent may: (i) reject or ignore the data as, for example, 
stemming from sensor noise, or arising from inconsistency with the assumed domain model 
 6 or (ii) update the existing domain model to accommodate the new previously unassimilated 
sensor data (Σo). The latter case both serves to extend the range of objects known to the agent 
and may be used as a cue to attend to the “novel” object. Similarly, a group of features 
interpreted as a known object, but with significant deviations from the model, may also be 
candidates for detailed inspection. Leading, in turn, to an updated model or differentiation of 
the model into two separate ones. 
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Figure 2: The main perceptual cycle 
3   Feature Clouds 
A feature cloud is a data structure that encodes a heterogeneous and spatially distributed set of 
sensor-detected features, where each feature is individually mapped to a position vector 
within a local coordinate frame. Feature clouds may be seen as a form of annotated point 
cloud in which the structure of the object is encoded as many points about a local coordinate 
frame, some (or all) of which are labelled with information about how that place on the 
surface of the object will impact on the observer’s visual sensors (the features). Point cloud 
representations have found favour recently in both computer graphics and engineering (e.g. 
Linsen, 2001).  
This point-based approach may be contrasted to other model-based representations in 
visual perception-based applications such as generalized cylinders (Marr 1982), superquadrics 
(Chella et al 2000) or geons (Pirri 2005) in which the shape of the modelled object must be 
deformed and fitted to the sensor data. Feature clouds directly encode the sensor (detector) 
related properties of the modelled object and are localisable (both in the 2D image plane and 
the 3D world space of the robot) to an arbitrary desired precision and do not rely on shape or 
surface matching.  
The cloud is partitioned into subsets of features that are pre-assigned to an assumed set of 
volumetric regions. Such regions correspond to our informal notion of a physical object or its 
parts. The whole takes on the form of a hierarchically organized tree-structure of such 
regions, where the subdivision of a host object into sub-parts proceeds until all their named 
features and their viewpoint-dependent appearances eventually appear as terminal leaf-nodes. 
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surfaces, represented as surface patches between the feature points
2. 
Each feature cloud is represented by sets of vector pencils; where each pencil comprises a 
set of straight-line segments intersecting at a single point – the centroid. Figure 2 shows 
feature cloud visualizations (Σo) of number of exemplar objects. Pencils mapping features to 
their appearances are interpreted as lines of sight fanning out into space. As each viewpoint 
also acts as the origin of another vector pencil whose end-points potentially locate a set of 
features, the overall geometrical form of an object with its set of features and their viewpoint 
indexed manifold appearances can be likened to a stellated polyhedron with the vertices 
mapping to the view points.  
Axiom A1 encodes the hierarchical decomposition of objects into object-parts, their 
features and appearances. Type is a class indentifier for each object, object-part, feature and 
appearance. In this definition, objects, object-parts and features can all have associated 
appearances
3. This reflects the underlying foveal-based vision model assumed here, where at 
different levels of visual resolution an object may have no detectable (i.e. resolvable) object-
parts or constituent features, though it can have an overall detectable appearance at any 
particular level of resolution. 
 
(A1) Φ(x0,v0,Type0,[x1,...,xn]) →  
  Ψ1(x1,v1,Type1,[...]) &...& Ψn(xn,vn,Typen,[...]), 
where: 
   if Φ=Object, then Ψ i∈{ObjectPart,Feature,Appearance} else 
 if  Φ=ObjectPart, then Ψ i∈{ObjectPart,Feature,Appearance} else 
 if  Φ=Feature, then Ψi∈{Feature,Appearance}, else 
  Φ=Ψi=Appearance 
Axiom A1: Encoding the Feature Cloud 
 
All elements (expressed as wffs) of this hierarchy uniformly take the form: Φ (name, 
vector, Type, Part-list), where Φ substitutes for Object, ObjectPart, Feature or Appearance. 
Each of these elements is uniquely identified by its name and is assigned a class Type. 
Vectors (always shown italic underlined, v) locate the centroid (notional position) of any 
object, feature or appearance (v1 … vn) with respect to the centroid of its supervenient feature 
or object (v0), or of the observer’s viewpoint (actual or notional) in space. Using this scheme 
the position of any sub-part of an object may be estimated relative to any other subpart by 
straightforward vector summation. Every logical operation between objects and their parts 
implies a corresponding vector operation.  
The  Part-list enumerates each of the component items (ObjectPart,  Feature or 
Appearance) at the next level in the description hierarchy. Each appearance is directly 
associated with a detector is assigned a class Type and a vector estimating the pose and 
position of the appearance from the current viewpoint, which together serve to identify the 
physical source of each sensor data assertion within the system and an estimate of its position 
in 3-space relative to the current viewpoint. Appearances have no sub-parts. The hierarchical 
nature of this definitional form allows objects to be represented and reasoned with at multiple 
levels of detail, and at any arbitrary level of precision, using the embedded numerical vectors. 
                                                      
2 Surfaces are not explicitly represented in the feature cloud, but are factored out and treated separately. 
We model object surfaces as a Deluanay triangulation of an arbitrary topology manifold surface in 3D 
space. Volumetric solids consequently take the form of polyhedra whose faces are ultimately 
decomposed into a finite set of triangles. See Randell and Witkowski (2006) for further discussion and 
formal definitions. 
3 Axiom A1 given here modifies and contrasts with the axiom (also designated “A1”) and logical 
model adopted in (Randell and Witkowski 2006; Witkowski and Randell 2006), in which the 
hierarchical model restricts appearances to attaching to features. This effectively limited the previous 
definition to a uniform field (i.e. non-foveated) visual sensor. 
 8 4   Feature Detectors and Appearances 
Central to the abductive process here is the deployment of “detectors”, devices that make 
assertions into Γ when the specific conditions they are tuned to occur in the visual field of 
view (FOV). In the scenario we describe here, these detectors are assumed derived from low-
level vision processing operations.  
Figure 3 (left) illustrates the effect of appearances of features. A single feature (for 
instance, the corner of the larger cube) appears differently from alternate viewpoints, and each 
is assigned a separate appearance type. Large cones in figure 4 (left) arranged radially from 
features represent the range for a given series of detectors. Each represents a pencil of 
viewpoints from the feature centroid. They may share a single appearance, or be divided into 
multiple appearances for any given range of distances from the feature. These then represent 
volumetric lobes in the space about the object. Each such lobe gives rise to one appearance 
definition. The small cones indicate individual appearances of detected features (as projected 
onto a notional image plane) from specific viewpoints.  
Note that it is the properties of the detector that determine the angular and positional range 
of the appearance type. Detectors (and hence appearances) may be designed to work over a 
wide range of viewpoints, or be highly specific to a small volume of space. The scope of 
detectors (and hence appearances) may overlap, may be ambiguous – in that distinct features 
may give rise to the same appearance. Features may not be detected at all from some 
viewpoints, either because the detectors are not sensitive to it, or by virtue of self-occlusion.  
Figure 3 (right) illustrates the appearances for some aspects of the corner detectors when 
viewed in the peri-foveal and foveal regions of the visual field. Note that the three distinct 
appearances of the features become effectively indistinguishable at the periphery of the visual 
field. 
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Figure 3: Left: Appearances of a feature (corner) from different viewpoints; right: Appearances of the feature 
in the foveal, peri-foveal and peripheral regions 
 
We admit a wide range of detector types to be assimilated within the logical framework 
described. Such operation might include line finding or edge detection routines, or, more 
usefully, the detector will respond to some distinctive, though not necessarily a unique, 
property of the physical object being observed (see the work of Lowe 2004; and Schmid and 
Mohr 1997 for recent advances in this area). Lowe, in particular, has developed powerful 
feature encoding techniques that allows for the fast storage and retrieval of arbitrary complex 
patterns drawn from real images, building on earlier notions of steerable filters (Rao and 
Ballard 1995). Such detectors may function over several octaves of image resolution and be 
insensitive to feature rotation. There is no stipulation here of the form detectors should take 
beyond that they are representative of the objects, parts or features that cause them, that they 
may be assigned a type and may be localised in the FOV with a centroid to support the vector 
representation. They need not be invariant on rotation or scale. There is also no suggestion 
here that artificial and natural detectors need operate on directly comparable principles. 
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 Figure 4: An Object (“O3”) hierarchy and its appearances at different levels of resolution 
 
Recall that appearances are mapped directly (but non-uniquely) to the feature(s), parts and 
objects they indicate by abductive inference. In this respect, individual sensor data items may 
be said to afford (by analogy with Gibson, 1979) their own explanation through their 
description as appearances. Physical objects in the world give rise to different effects on the 
detectors under differing circumstances, such as when viewed from different distances, from 
varying angles, under different conditions or different areas of a foveal imager. This effect is 
illustrated in figure 4 for a single physical object at three notional levels of resolution. The top 
layer shows possible appearances at the peripheral resolution (shown here as Gaussian 
blurring, for illustration) from different viewpoints – six stages of rotation at two different 
distances, representing instances from a set of all possible detectable viewpoints. The peri-
foveal layer shows a small number of sub-part appearances and the foveal layer a number of 
exemplar high-resolution detectors. Note that the detector images shown are illustrative only, 
the actual encoding of the detector is by type, a symbolic entity. Figure 4 also shows the 
effect of propagation of the distinctiveness values (dv) for each type up the hierarchy.  
Note that some easily extracted feature types, such as line segments, are common to very 
many objects, and, as such, provide little discriminatory power. However, by virtue of the 
hierarchical definition of the feature cloud, simple features may be composited into compound 
features, which increases their discriminatory capacity.  
Objects are not necessarily only characterized by static feature detectors. Many everyday 
(animate) objects are detected by distinctive motion profiles and may equally serve to trigger 
a hypothesis of the associated object type by abductive reasoning
4. These play an essential 
part in notions of exogenous attention. The reliable detection of both change and recognition 
by motion represent substantive challenges to the computer vision community (e.g. Cédras 
and Shah 1995, Radke et al 2005). We will also consider the role of non-object based 
detectors, those that respond primarily to areas of high colour saturation, luminance or 
change.  
5   The Panorama 
The current interpretation, Δi exists solely in the present. When the detector stream (Γ ) 
changes or is interrupted the current interpretation collapses and must be rebuilt. Yet it seems 
clear we both have and need a memory of visual events and percepts. This is the role of the 
                                                      
4 Even more broadly, one might also consider cross-model forms of detection, sounds, for instance, 
which may be both localisable and distinctive of an object type. 
 10 panorama (denoted Δp) in the Abductive Perception model. At the conclusion of each 
perceptual cycle, elements of the current interpretation Δi are transferred to Δp for retention. 
All elements of Δi are in viewer-centric coordinates and these are transferred directly to Δp. 
The panorama structure is intended to model the “sense of space” about the self, 
generating and maintaining a “situational and spatial awareness” in terms of objects in the 
robot’s immediate surroundings and to provide a stable ego-centric “platform” into which the 
current field of view (FOV) may be projected. This structure allows the robot, for instance, to 
reason about its surroundings without direct perception of them. It allows a robot with a 
rapidly moving visual field to establish a baseline set of hypotheses in Δh (on efficiency 
grounds) by repopulating the area of the image-plane with items from Δp.  
The notion of a panorama appears to be particularly relevant to humans, who have both a 
foveal eye and whose eyes saccade constantly, in establishing a stable, viewer centric, percept 
of their immediate environment.   
Elements of Δp are transformed to maintain a constant notion of “forward/left/right” 
centred about the observer’s egocentric viewpoint following any motion. We propose an 
anticipatory transform that predicts the position the interpretations in Δp would appear in the 
next time step. As the information in Δp is already encoded spatially about the current 
viewpoint, a simple 3D matrix transform may be applied to the vector components to place 
them in an appropriate place following any movement by the robot or its gaze system.  
As an exemplar of the notional form used, Let f1,...,fn be a set of linear transformations 
(deployed as matrix operations) s.t. f: V → W where V and W are vectors spaces. And let 
t1,...,tn be a totally ordered set of time points (i.e. image frames).  Each wff of the form: 
Φ(x,v,Type,[...]) is  now re-worked as follows: Φ(x,v,Type,[...],t). Let Tf(Δp) be the 
transformation function f applied to the set of wffs in Δp, s.t. Tf: A → B, where A and B are 
sets of wffs. Then the updating of the vectors in Δp is defined as follows: 
 
Tf(Δp)= {Φ(x,vj,Type,...,t+1)| (Φ(x,v,Type,...,t) &  
         fi(v,vj))→ Φ(x,vi,Type,...,t+1,),  
               where: Φ(x,v,Type,...,t)∈Δp } 
 
The anticipatory transform, Tf, has the effect of re-writing each vector embedded in every 
statement in Δp between image time points t and t+1. Tf may be determined by at least three 
different, but computationally well established, routes: (i) the anticipated consequences of an 
initiated motor action – trivially computed in the case of a mobile robot from the x,y,θ  
displacement begun, less obviously so for a multi-degree of freedom humanoid, (ii) 
displacement detected directly from motion sensors or odometry, and (iii) a transform derived 
from imager displacement, as typified by the SLAM (Simultaneous Localization and 
Mapping) class of algorithm (e.g. Davison 2003).  
The advantage of option (i) being that the computation can be conducted during the 
motion. Pre-determined ballistic eye saccades are also well modelled in this way (e.g. Shibata 
et al 2001). Option (iii) is most appropriate where the compound effects of many degrees of 
freedom must be considered, but it does require an active imager and current SLAM based 
techniques are not generally well suited to systems exhibiting both broad and rapid saccadic 
movements. It might be conjectured that an analogue of each of these methods finds 
application in human perception, depending on the prevailing circumstances.  
The question arises as to what (and at what level of detail) should items from Δi be 
transferred to Δp for retention after the interpretation cycle. Individual objects are naturally 
ordered in Δi by their explanatory value (though we shall argue later for an attentive salience 
of preference ordering), directly reflecting their level of evidential support. A sub-set of these 
items are selected for attention at the highest level of description (i.e. wffs of the form 
Object(…)), and reported to the higher cognitive layers. There is evidence (section 8) that 
humans select one as the locus of attention and record several more sub-attentively.  
 11 Level of evidential support seems a poor measure on which to select for attention. The 
next section describes how this ordering and selection process may be modified to meet the 
robot’s functional needs. We would further argue that it is not appropriate to transfer 
descriptive sentences at the feature or appearance level into Δp, as these are potentially 
indistinguishable from direct sensor data, but rather as an abstraction, taken from the higher 
levels of the object description. 
6   The Perceptual Process 
Figure 2 illustrates the main perceptual cycle, which is further considered here. The original 
definition of this cycle (Randell and Witkowski, 2006) assumed a uniform field sensor and 
that the perceptual process will be completed in one imaging timeframe. The treatment here 
will modify that assumption to account for the three levels of resolution, foveal, peri-foveal 
and peripheral, previously identified for an idealized foveal imaging system. This process is 
applied exhaustively to all detected features in the image. This is equivalent to the notions of 
pre-attentive processing (e.g. Theeuwes 1993) or late selection for attention (Pashler 1998). It 
establishes the conditions required to: (a) process sensor items within the peri-foveal region in 
detail, (b) to identify areas in the peripheral region that are indicative of salient objects to be 
attended to in the near future, and (c) to inspect specific features in detail in the central foveal 
area. Section 7, describing the attention process, spreads across several perceptual episodes 
representing the flow of overt visual attention, as indicated by eye/imager gaze movements, 
and reflecting a serialisation of the perceptual process.  
The cycle starts with a retinal mapping of features (Γ  ), using a small selection of 
distinctive features (and their appearances) to hypothesize objects than might explain those 
features and seeks to corroborate (or refute) those hypotheses by projecting the expected 
locations of other features associated with the conjectured object and comparing these with 
the sensor data.  
For each separate image frame Γ will contain a mix of appearances, corresponding to the 
peripheral, peri-foveal and foveal imager areas. Superimposed over this will be the area 
(swept volume) of the transformed panorama (Δp), used primarily in this instance to maintain 
a record of recently attended items and their locations relative to the viewpoint of the observer 
in a viewer-, as opposed to retino-, centric coordinate frame.  
The following steps summarize the (pre-attentive) perceptual process using the abductive 
perception model: 
 
(1) Complete anticipatory transform on Δp, seed Δh with the currently overlapping FOV. 
(2) Pre-process the image to identify detected (section 4) appearances. Record them in the 
Γ  Structure.  
(3) Evaluate the rank order ro of each object, identifying those object models in Σo that are 
supported by the current evidence in Γ. This is a preliminary “recognition by parts” step, 
establishing candidate objects for treatment as hypotheses.  
(4) Match sets of unexplained but distinctive elements (according to dv(F)) from Γ to 
candidate (according to ro order) object descriptions in Σo to generate object hypotheses. This 
is the abductive step – selecting hypotheses from partial evidence.  
(5) For features detected in the peri-foveal region a more detailed match between sensor 
data and object models may be attempted to both obtain a high confidence identification of 
the visual object and corresponding explanation of the sensor features, as follows:  
 12 (5.1) Identify four (or more) non-coplanar matches between features in Γ and features of 
corresponding Type in a single object model and postulate a projection into the 3D space 
represented by the FOV
5.  
(5.2) Write this set of wffs (representing all the features for that object) to the hypothesis 
space Δh for each hypothesized object; rewrite every embedded vector in the object definition 
reflecting the new projection from the robot’s viewpoint. This is the deductive (or prediction) 
step.   
(6) Evaluate the ev for each hypothesized object to determine the extent to which it 
explains the sensor data for the projection area it occupies on the image plane. This is the 
corroboration step. 
(7) Retract untenable hypotheses of low explanatory value from Δh. All wffs relating to the 
hypothesis are retracted and any sensor data features it might have accounted for are released, 
requiring further explanation.  
(8) Repeat from (3) until all significant sensor data elements of Γ have a coherent 
explanation (i.e. that the sensor data can be accounted for as being matched to features of a 
hypothesised object), and where all the ground hypotheses in Δh satisfy the domain 
constraints (Σc). Discard (as noise) any un-interpretable data items or create new object 
description (section 2) from group of unexplained data items.  
(9) Transfer explanation of the sensor data (Δh) to the interpretation space (Δi). The net 
effect of this processing is to place a single explanation in Δi for the incoming data, as wffs, 
and their (reconstructed) poses.  
(10) Replace all objects in Δp in the area of the FOV with those from Δi, but retain any 
IOR labels on objects according to location. Remove direct sensor detail from any elements 
of Δp and successively remove detail (to full deletion) from older Δp elements not currently in 
the FOV. Finally, increment the process time t (section 7.2). 
 
In peripheral areas any single distinctive feature, characteristic of an object type may serve 
to establish the hypothesis of an instance of that type of object in the image plane. Equally, 
objects in the peripheral area that subtend a larger area, or that are partially occluded, may be 
hypothesized from combinations of their characteristic parts. Objects sampled at low-
resolution (e.g. located in the peripheral region of the imager) take the form of peripheral 
“impressionistic” hypotheses. These will later drive the saccadic scanpath/visual attention 
strategy. These hypotheses are transferred to Δi as a plausible interpretation of these areas of 
the image. Step (4) is therefore intended to be largely equivalent to Rensink’s (2002) notion 
of a “gist” or “quick and dirty” assessment of the image properties for this area of the image 
plane. 
Step (10) implies that old visual data is overwritten by the current interpretation in Δi (i.e. 
with no active visual memory, Wolfe 1999) and that the record of older objects outside the 
FOV are stripped of all visual data, retaining only a conceptual record within the working 
space of the robot. 
The net effect of this process is to present a hypothesis-based explanation of the visual 
scene into Δi in terms of Σo object descriptions. This combination of broadly estimated and 
hypothesized peripheral objects and detailed “positioned” object models in the central area, 
combined with the raw sensor data appearances allows higher-level task modules to 
interrogate the perceptual system, either in terms of the original sensor data, from Γ, or in 
                                                      
5 In trials, we used the DeMenthon and Davis (1995) POSIT (Pose from Orthography and Scaling with 
ITerations) method to determine the “pose” of the object model, as though it were projected back into 
the image space of the robot. Of the many algorithms that have been developed to solve this 
geometrical correspondence problem, POSIT (Dementhon and Davis 1995) and SoftPOSIT (David et 
al 2004) are of particular note. In general, non-unique solutions to the image point to object pose 
problem can be obtained from a minimum of three matches (Haralick et al 1994), however POSIT 
assumes a match of ≥4 non coplanar registration points and that their relative geometry is known. This 
requirement is relaxed in SoftPOST. See also (Horaud et al 1997, Hu and Wu 2002) for real-time 
vision and robotics applications. 
 13 object interpreted terms in the manner of sense data (e.g. Huemer 2004), from Δi. For a 
foveal system, any apparent detail in the periphery of the scene must therefore be a 
“reconstruction” – an “illusion” – derived from the hypothesized model-based data in Σo.  
The object at the foveal centre will be considered as the locus of overt visual attention for 
the current cycle and as such will be passed to the (notional) higher levels of cognitive 
processing. We suggest that several additional items that are worthy of attention are also 
transferred to the higher levels, as items of covert attention. A mechanism for this is presented 
in the next section. Recall (from section 1) that elements of visual attention are not 
necessarily “adopted” or acted upon by the higher levels.  
In the Itti and Koch (2001) model, inhibition of return is applied retino-centrically to each 
instance of the feature detector. This presupposes a fixed viewpoint. This cannot be the case 
for a mobile or humanoid robot, or any system with saccadic (or directed) eye movements, in 
which the image appears to translate across the image or retinal plane with each motion. 
Under these assumptions, inhibition of return is more naturally expressed as a tagged property 
of object interpretations recorded in Δp. Inhibition of return consequently tracks with the 
interpreted objects. Expanding the definition of each object or sub-part (axiom A1), coupled 
to its vector estimation, generates an area of inhibition on the imager plane: indicating the 
inhibited volume represented in Δp as projected back onto the imaging plane. Application of 
the anticipatory transform (section 5) ensures that this area remains directed at the object 
volume inhibited, regardless of rotation and translation motions of the robot and its imager.  
7   The Attentional Process Model 
In order to achieve the characteristic “sparse attend” eye-gaze model described earlier we 
adopt a three part attentional strategy. We continue with the assumption that peripheral 
detectors are sufficiently characteristic of the objects they are appearances of to establish a 
reasonable working hypothesis about the objects that cause them. Further, it will be assumed 
that peri-foveal detectors have sufficient resolution to make robust recognition of the objects 
they describe, when the perceptual cycle (section 6) is applied to the available features and 
their appearances.  
Finally, it will be assumed that foveal gaze is required for detailed corroboration of object 
identity (and effective perception of detail, such as reading text). Where an observer may be 
expected to have many individuated models of otherwise similar object types, such as faces, 
we may expect the foveal gaze phase to be concentrated on the features. This will serve to 
confirm the specific identity, to update the model to accommodate on-going change (as is the 
case with human faces), and to acquire (learn) new variants of the object model as needed.  
7.1   Preferences over objects  
The order in which objects are attended to exploits various preferences defined on object-
types, objects and their respective features. These preferences are defined on the sets of 
names and predicates defined within our formal language. Preference orderings are defined on 
all object types (Pfpref) from ∑O, types of detected objects (Afattend), detected instances of 
objects (OIfinstance) and on the component object-parts and features of objects (SPfsubpart). We 
refer to f as the preference order operator. An extended definition of the preference order 
operator is given in appendix 1. The following preference orderings are defined over object 
types (in ∑O), object instances and object-parts: 
 
(i) Pfpref  = <O1, O2, …, On-1,On>, where Oi∈∑O
(ii) Afattend = <<Oa, Ob, Oc, Od, Oe> , <Of , … , On>>, where Oi∈Pfpref   
(iii) OIfinstance = <Oa | << oa1, oa2, … , oak> , < oak+1, oak+2, … , oan>>> 
(iv) SPfsubpart = <Oa | << S1, S2, … , Sk> , < Sk+1, Sk+2, … , Sn>>> 
 
Definition (i) provides a preference ordering over all the objects currently known to the 
system. Given a set of all the object types in ∑O:  O={Oi|Object(x,v,Oi,...)}, where: 
 14 Object(x,v,Oi,...)∈∑O, we can order the elements of O={O1, O2, …, On-1, On} by some 
preference measure pref, indicating the current predisposition of the system to prefer one 
object type over another, such that  P fpref = <O1, O2, …, On-1,On> meaning that on the fpref 
measure, Oi is preferred to O j,, where   i<j<n. This ordering need not be constant, but will 
change to reflect the task being carried out by the system. For instance, in a navigation or 
driving task, object types that represent hazards or obstacles will be moved to the from of the 
list, while during a search task the object or class of objects being sought will be moved to the 
front of the list, relegating other object definitions not directly required. In section 8.5 we 
propose a specific method of achieving this preference ordering by increasing the significance 
of individual features associated with each object. 
Definition (ii) divides the previous overall preference list (Pfpref) into two parts, those 
elements that are supported within the current field of view (the head) and those that are not 
supported within the FOV (the tail). Definition (iii) considers all the instances (o) of a single 
object type (O) in the current FOV. By splitting this list into two parts, only some of those 
instances (in the list head) will be considered, before attention moves on to some other aspect 
of the scene (as defined by the next object type in the Afattend list). Definition (iv) decomposes 
a single object type (O) into its sub-part types (S) or specific object instance (o) into its 
individual sub-parts (s). This is required to allow detailed inspection by the scanpath of the 
parts of an object, as indicated in figure 1. 
Note the <<H>,<T>> and <O|<<H>,<T>>> partition constructs for Afattend, OIfinstance and 
SPfsubpart, where H is the head and T the tail of the list. In the former (ii) this represents a 
simple splitting of the list into two parts (the overall preference order within the two parts is 
unaffected). The latter indicates an expansion of an object type (Oa) into its instances 
currently in the FOV (iii), or its subparts (iv). We also use the head of the list to factor out 
primary (overt) and secondary items of attention in the model: in this case the first element of 
the list represents the autonomic candidate for overt attention (pre-attentive) and therefore the 
destination of direct foveation. Elements from the remainder of the list head are then 
candidates for covert attention.  
In each case the cardinality (length) of the head of the list will vary according to the mode 
of attention we wish to emulate and this also determines the length of the cyclic scanpath. 
Where many elements are admitted to the list head, attention is lightly focussed with many 
candidates for covert attention and attention is highly susceptible to interruption by 
exogenous events. As the number of elements is reduced attention becomes increasingly 
focussed with fewer secondary items and attains greater resistance to interruption. We also 
consider the case where the list head comprises a single object type or, in the extreme, a 
single object instance (section 9.2).   
The scan-path order is determined via a structural decomposition of the elements of 
preference lists by successively applying (i) through to (iv). This process maps detected 
objects in the FOV to the root nodes of their object descriptions, and uses their object 
descriptions (as hierarchical structures in ΣO) to determine a node-node traversal path through 
the set of detected objects and their constituent parts and features. As the whole perceptual 
process is reactive, the traversal of the tree during this cycle can at any time be modified by 
IOR, which may release the inhibition associated with a previously detected object at a 
specific location. 
One might suggest substituting dv as the pref index value for the Pfpref list (i) in a robotics 
context. Distinctive objects serve to explain more of the sensor data, leaving less to be 
explained with subsequent processing effort. In many ways, though, this is unsatisfactory. 
Attentive preference across objects should directly reflect the observer’s functional 
requirements in relation to the objects, the uses they will be put to – and the cognitive tasks 
the observer is undertaking at any given time.  
This preference ordering is itself covert, in general a person is not aware of the preference 
ordering being adopted by their visual attention system. We assume that no overt act of will is 
required to establish a new preference ordering in relation to an established task (task 
 15 shifting) and that individual items may be selected voluntarily for preferential attentive 
processing. In a robot, these will be inherent in, or inferred from, the task being performed.  
Where a static image is being viewed, we may expect this order of the Afattend list (ii) to 
remain largely constant, while no task is requested of the observer. Under static image 
conditions the scanpath will follow the general order defined by the object types in the list 
head, and repeat once the IOR effect has dissipated. When the observer is moving we may 
expect the elements of this list to change between image frames as objects appear in view and 
others leave the frame. 
In the case of the OIfinstance list (iii), the preference order is appropriately defined by the 
level of evidential support (ev) for individual objects o of type Oa at each of the given image 
locations  1…n, such that instances where there is strong support are preferred and so 
investigated or confirmed before the others. Alternative ordering strategies, such as object 
proximity, might also be considered. In this case, the list head length determines the number 
of individual object instances that will be inspected before the object type is inhibited and the 
next most preferred object visited. 
For the SPfsubpart list (iv), as with the object preference list, the sub-part/feature order can 
be directly related to the dv value (the “default model”, see section 8.5) of the part in question 
or, more reasonably, relate to the functional significance of the part relative to the whole (i.e. 
the eyes and mouth to a face). This sub-division into sub-parts may be applied recursively 
through the object description hierarchy until the feature level is encountered, but we do not 
consider this case further.  
7.2   The scanpath cycle 
This section describes the basic scanpath model. At the start of the cycle we assume that the 
previous saccadic imager movement has just been completed, that a new image has just been 
presented and that the destination of the movement was an object instance indicated as being 
of the highest attentional preference (op). Note that the pre-attentive hypothesis that an object 
in the peripheral area is of a particular preferred type is no guarantee that it will be so on 
closer examination at the fovea. The record (by labelling in Δp) of recently attended items 
will serve the function of inhibition of return (IOR). We define a function ior(o) which labels 
any object instance o (or part or feature, s) in Δp with the most recent time of inhibition t. The 
symbol τ will be used to represent a time increment (typically some number of perceptual 
cycles) defining the temporal extent of the inhibition of return effect. Values of (ior(o) - t) > 0 
indicate an object with active inhibition, zero or negative values indicate spent or previously 
uninhibited values.  
We define four further functions: (1) saccade(o), which rotates the imager to align with the 
current (off-fovea) image plane location of object (or subpart) instance o or s. (2) attend(o), 
which labels the wff describing o (or s) as the item of overt visual attention for this cycle. (3) 
pre_attend(o) labelling o (or s) as the pre-attentive item. (4) sub_attend(o) labelling o (or s) as 
(covertly) sub-attentive. 
The attentive process may be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) Complete the perceptual cycle (section 6, resulting in an interpretation Δi, indicating the 
current object of highest attentional preference op at the fovea) yielding a set of detected 
object types in list S1 ({O1,…,On}) and their associated objects in list S2 ({o1,…,on}). 
(2) Process attended object (op) at fovea. If object op is to be inspected in detail (on the basis 
of novelty, ambiguity, complexity) perform sub-steps, else (3) 
(2.1) Expand the current object at fovea op into its constituent sub-parts s1… sk (i.e. < op | < s1, 
s2, … , sk> , < … >>) according to the sub-part ordering SPfsubpart) 
(2.2) Select first sub-part si without any inhibition of return (ior(si) - t ≤ 0 in Δp)  
(2.3) Send identity of sub-part si to cognitive layer as overt attend item (attend(si))  
(2.4) Set IOR for attended sub-part si to current time t plus inhibition increment  (ior(si ) = t + 
τ) 
 16 (2.5) Initiate saccadic movement to location of si on image plane (saccade(si)) 
(2.6) Continue inspecting sub-parts of op in detail? If yes, then (5) 
(3) Set IOR for attended object op to current time t plus increment  (ior(op) = t + τ) 
(4) Send identity of object op to cognitive layer as overt attended item (attend(op)) 
(5) Sort object types in S1 according to current attend list (Afattend) to form ordered list (S3) of 
object types: S3=<<O1,…, On>,<…>> 
(6) Select and report items for covert attention: While (Oi from head S3) 
(6.1) Expand < Oi | < oi1, oi2, … , oik> , < … >> (by OIfinstance from S2) 
(6.2) Select object oij instance in this list with minimum inhibition of return (min(ior(oij)) in 
Δp) and send to cognitive layer as the pre-attentive item (pre_attend(oij))  
(6.2.1) If no si initiate saccade(oij) in image plane (oij becomes op next cycle) 
(6.3) Next n-1 oij where min(ior(oij) - t) in Δp sub_attend(oij) 
(7) Return to (1), starting the next perceptual cycle 
 
This basic cycle captures the essential aspects of the scanpath strategy indicated by 
previous studies (e.g. Stark and Choi 1996) and illustrates a number of interesting properties. 
We use the text that follows to further nuance the scanpath behaviour. 
Step (1) performs the underlying perceptual cycle (section 6), returning a partial 
description of the scene in Δi in terms of object hypotheses (S2), expressed as wffs, and their 
corresponding types in S1. These will later be sorted by the preference criteria. The object at 
the fovea is designated op.  
Step (2) emulates inspection within a single object. In this case a number of smaller 
saccadic movements are made within the boundary of the attended object. At this stage the 
pose and estimated size of the object has been determined and the specific locations of 
features (s1 … sk) should be accurately predicted. Step (2) proceeds in sub-stages. First (2.1) 
the foveated object is decomposed into sub-parts (object-parts or features) according to the 
prevailing preference order and the oldest (least recently inhibited) element is selected (2.2). 
The part (si, not the object) is labelled as the object of visual attention (2.3) and maximally 
(i.e. most recently) inhibited (2.4). The saccade to the selected part is initiated (2.5). 
Inhibition on the part ensures further close inspection will select the next preferred sub-part, if 
required (2.6) following the next perceptual cycle. This early onset of the saccade is broadly 
consistent with findings in human studies that attention to parts within a single object is faster 
than between objects (e.g. Duncan 1984, Vecera et al 2000).  
There are several conditions under which such detailed inspection is warranted. First, the 
detailed construction of new or novel object models for deposit into ΣO, or to accommodate 
new information about an existing object model. Note that novel or recently introduced 
objects do not necessarily precipitate attentional shift in humans, though such events are 
invariably associated with luminance transients – which do (e.g. Franconeri et al 2005, 
Theeuwes 1995). Second, to seek to reduce any mismatch between an existing model and the 
data presented and, third, to reduce ambiguity of interpretation
6. 
Step (3) sets the inhibition label for the current attended object (op), as reported to the 
cognitive layer (step 4). Step (5) builds the attention candidate orderings from the object type 
list S1. Step (6) expands each element of the ordered object type list S2 into its localized 
instances (oi1, etc.) The first of these is labelled as pre-attentive and (if there was no part 
based saccade), the imager is rotated to the vector direction of the object. This object instance 
will be op in the next cycle. Finally, a small number (n-1) of remaining uninhibited object 
instances from the expanded object lists are also labelled as sub-attentive for the cognitive 
layer. 
                                                      
6 Each (single) hypothesized interpretation of each object in Δi may be labelled with an indication of 
the degree of uncertainty in Δh just prior to the selection. We note in passing that such labelling might 
be interpreted at the cognitive levels as a “mindsight” (after Rensink 2004) event, the perception that 
the object interpretation is in some way suspect, but without any indication as to why. 
 17 Note that this description only refers to autonomic (involuntary) eye movements, as 
determined by the preference list (Pfpref), although the object preferences and so the attention 
list (Afattend) may be either the default or task based. We suggest that for each list, or sub-list, 
an upper bound should be established limiting the number of instances of a given type that 
will be inspected before the next item in the list is selected. This is the list head length. For 
illustration, we will assume this bound to be four or five
7. So that, if there are more than, say, 
five instances of object Oa, then only the first five are inspected before Ob is selected. If the 
object to be inspected in detail, then only the first five or so features are inspected
8, and so on.  
7.3   Managing attention preferences 
We assume that each individual observer will develop a attentive preference strategy over 
time, according to their interests and daily needs. In general, we note that people have a 
strong propensity to attend to the human form and in particular to facial features. There is 
doubtless a shared core of object types that remain high on the human attentional preference 
order. Equally, attentive preference order (Afpref) is not intended to be unchanging or 
unchangeable. It seems attention preference order is easily temporarily manipulated according 
to task or need. This context change can be both rapid and comprehensive. A driver may 
attend to one set of object types at one moment, leave his car and attend to quite another as a 
pedestrian immediately after. Equally, the participant in an attention experiment may attend 
preferentially to the object of the experiment for its duration and subsequently never do so 
again. It also seems highly likely that the long term, underlying, preference order is malleable, 
perhaps reflecting the frequency with which each object definition is intentionally raised to 
the front of the preference order. It is within our common experience that practice (i.e. 
intentional looking) will lead to automatic noticing of such objects of interest. For instance, 
an ornithologist may notice birds in a scene, where others, and he previously, would not have 
attended to them.  
8   Discussion: Aspects of Attention 
In this section we discuss four related aspects of natural attention in the context of the formal 
model of perception and attention just described. These four aspects are: (1) autonomic 
scanpath generation and overt (fixated) attention, (2) secondary and covert attention, (3) the 
role of exogenous (sensor-driven) attention, (4) endogenous (volitional task-based) attention. 
The next section will consider two forms of inattention, change blindness effects and   
inattentional blindness effects. The representation of perception employed in this paper is 
inspired by natural systems but is then highly abstracted away from the underlying neural 
mechanisms that mediate animal and human attention processes. The primary purpose is to 
identify underlying principles that might be applied to an artificial or robot model, inspired 
by, but not slavishly emulating, natural attention. However, we will indicate where we have 
noted interesting parallels or significant differences.  
The notion of “visual attention” covers a vast portmanteau of effects, which have been 
extensively researched in a wide range of diverse disciplines. The discussion here is 
necessarily limited to a sub-set of this diversity. Each is analysed in terms of the object 
perception approach, the management of preference lists (in particular, the content and length 
                                                      
7 Such limits are open to debate and must be established according to need. At the object level we note 
that some investigations indicate that inhibition of return is effective over a period of approximately 1.5 
seconds (e.g. Taylor and Klein 1998) and each saccade/fixation pair is approximately 300mS. This 
accords with established eye-gaze data (Noton and Stark 1971) and, less directly, with Multiple Object 
Tracking (MOT) tasks (Pylyshyn 2001), although part inspection appears to extend the scanpath cycle 
(figure 1 and text).  
8 Note again that at the object-part or feature level a minimum of four separate image based position 
estimates of parts or features are required to perform the POSIT pose reconstruction (DeMenthon and 
Davis 1995) to project the object model into Δh. 
 18 of the list head) to predispose the perception system to attend to specific object types, and the 
inhibition of return (IOR) mechanism.   
8.1   The Autonomic Scanpath and Overt Visual Attention  
This section considers the autonomic control of eyegaze movements. The order of the gaze 
scanpath in the model is determined by the current preference (Pfpref) list and its active sub-
set, the attention list (Afattend). In turn, these preference orderings are manipulated by the 
cognitive layer according to current tasks and needs. If no task is specified the preference 
orderings revert to their defaults. No further stipulation need be made by the cognitive layer 
to control attention, the scanpath is determined by the cycle given in section 7.2. At each 
fixation, a single typed object or object-part from the foveal area is identified as of primary or 
overt visual attention. This single wff is tagged as the primary locus of visual attention and 
reported to the cognitive layer. Recall that the cognitive layer need not take any action on the 
basis of this notification, which is automatic and continuous. 
We see this autonomous mode as normal for both humans and robots. Foveal attention is 
properly directed at semantically significant objects that appear within the visual field, in a 
priority order established by the preference list. Inhibition of return recorded in the panorama 
emulates a cyclic condition for the scan, with conditions defined for detailed inspection of 
objects in the visual field. The intention here is to emulate a situation where the observer has 
a “gist” of the scene comprising broad hypotheses, but about which foveal attention is 
directed to give a detailed, but narrow, view of each place that is attended to in a sequential 
manner.  
It may be more appropriate to consider the item selected in step 6.2 of the attention cycle 
(oij) as the true locus of overt visual attention, as it is the location that will be confirmed by 
foveal inspection in the next perceptual cycle, and it is therefore pre-attentive (Theeuwes et al 
1998). Where the effect of attention is to initiate motor action, this gives the robot one clear 
saccade/fixation cycle (say 200-300ms, by analogy with human perception) in response time 
advantage in advance of the confirmed attention. Where foveation subsequently disconfirms 
the hastily prepared hypothesis, the action may be cancelled. 
Autonomic mode is suspended for brief (or possibly somewhat extended) periods under 
specific conditions, some of which are described further in the following sections. Certain 
exogenous signals (e.g. detected abrupt changes of luminance, or high saturation detectors, 
etc., section 4) override this object based autonomic control (section 8.3), directing the gaze 
point to the estimated source of the detected signal. Equally, specific voluntary or planned 
movements of gaze, initiated directly by the cognitive layer also take precedence over 
autonomic control. Voluntary control operates independently of inhibition of return (or nearly 
so, e.g. Klein and MacInnes, 1999), whereas exogenous (Itti and Koch, 2001) control is 
apparently always subject to inhibition of return.  
8.2    Secondary and Covert Attention 
We define secondary attention as the notion that several items (as wffs in the model) are 
passed to the cognitive layer at each perceptual cycle, in addition to the primary locus of 
attention. As there can only be one point of overt attention on the scanpath at each instant, 
these points are, by definition, independent of the fixation point. Note, however, that we 
separate out the single pre-attentive item (steps 5 and 6 in the scanpath cycle, section 7.2), 
which becomes the candidate location for the next fixation point in the immediately following 
perceptual cycle. The notion of covert attention reflects the possibility that the cognitive layer 
might inspect the Δi structure
9 as a volitional activity to bring any item currently interpreted 
in the visual field into attention. 
                                                      
9 Although it might be argued that such inspection is more properly conducted within the panorama Δp, 
particularly in the light of the debate about visual memory (e.g. Simons and Rensink 2005, Wolfe 
1999, considered further in section 9.1). 
 19 In addition to the single primary point of visual attention, we model a secondary 
attentional process in which a (selectable) number of object instances in the visual field from 
the head, but not at the head, of the attention list A are labelled as attentionally significant. 
These wffs are also reported to the cognitive layer. It is assumed that these preferentially 
evoke overt attentional behaviour if acted upon by the cognitive layer, but are in any case 
likely candidates for overt attention by virtue of their ranking in the attention list. They are 
not subject to any inhibition of return effect, so a single sub-attentive object may be retained 
over a number of attentive cycles without apparent diminution so long as it remains in the 
head of the object instance (OIfinstance) list. 
Pylyshyn and Storm’s (1988) seminal Multiple Object Tracking (MOT) task experimental 
procedures point directly to the presence of these secondary attentional artefacts. Participants 
are shown a screen of multiple identical objects, some of which are made to blink at the 
beginning of the experiment indicating they are to be tracked. The objects then move 
smoothly, but unpredictably, about the display area. At a given time one of the objects is 
indicated with a pointer and the participant indicates whether that object was to be tracked. 
Participants generally perform substantially better than chance on these tasks where the 
number of tracked objects is five or fewer
10. The experiment points to an ability to maintain a 
sub-attentional track of multiple non-foveal objects. This is modelled by installing the n 
identified objects to be tracked as instances at the head of the (len(OIfinstance) = n) list for a 
single nominated object type (len(Afattend) = 1), which are therefore monitored by the 
sub_attend() function described earlier.  
An equally significant question arises as to whether it is possible to bring into awareness 
any item at will, whether sub-attended or not, and without gaze shift – covert attention. The 
model would propose that the description of the whole FOV is available in Δi (or Δp) and that 
this may be interrogated at will while the point of gaze is held constant under volitional 
control (although apparently with some effort in the case of a human). Under these 
circumstances, of course, only the coarse grained hypotheses are available for consideration, 
but these are generally sufficient for recognition and general placement (via the object 
appearance description and its associated viewpoint vector representation). 
8.3   Exogenous attention 
We define exogenous attention as that which is mediated directly by the visual properties of 
the items in the visual field. Exogenous attention is therefore largely independent of the 
semantic content of items viewed, not all attentional control is object preference derived. A 
number of detector conditions have been identified (e.g. Itti and Koch 2001) that are 
independent of the features associated with object definitions (section 4), although not 
necessarily independently of object location. These include (but are not necessarily limited to) 
rapid changes of luminance at a given place in the field of view, areas of high colour 
saturation and certain forms of movement or change.  
These events may override the normal course of overt attention and direct the gaze to 
saccade to the location of the source within the visual field. Such events are therefore in direct 
competition with other mechanisms of gaze control
11. Within the model, such artefacts direct 
the perceptual cycle to process the item at the centre of the field of view and so the object 
associated with the source of the sensory event. This form of gaze control is subject to the 
                                                      
10 It is unclear why human attention appears to be restricted to tracking this number of objects, possibly 
an evolutionary legacy stemming from our role as a pack hunter in which actions of both the quarry 
and other member of the group must be tracked to coordinate effective predation behaviour. Equally, it 
might be argued that the ability to track multiple predators is advantageous, where the roles are 
reversed. In the model, this value is controlled by the free variable n (step 6, section 7.2). There is no 
reason to suppose that it might not be set to any convenient value in a robotic or artificial application, 
allowing an arbitrary number of sub-attentive items to be considered. 
11 Several detailed models of the exogenous/endogenous gaze selection mechanism have been proposed 
for the superior colliculus, the dorsal midbrain structure widely considered to be the seat of the neural 
basis of saccadic eye movement control (e.g. Grossberg et al 1997, Trappenberg et al 2001). 
 20 inhibition of return mechanism and the object (and so the source of the exogenous sensory 
event) is labelled as inhibited, as with overt attention.  
We use the cardinality of the list head as an indicator of the degree to which exogenous 
events will pre-empt the autonomic or endogenous modes of attentive behaviour. Where there 
are many items in the head (unfocussed attention), items of low exogenous salience may be 
admitted into the object list (i.e. general properties such as colour saturation compete 
effectively with object preference based features) and drive foveation. Where the length of the 
list head is reduced (object focussed attention) the salience threshold becomes successively 
raised, making it increasingly hard for exogenous events to be represented in the attentive 
process. We describe the mechanism no further here, beyond observing that were numeric 
values to be associated with the object preference list and an equivalent preference range 
assigned to the salience measures, the two might easily be merged into a single preference 
ranking. Opinions vary as to the bounds of interruptability by exogenous visual events (e.g. 
Theeuwes 2004) or directed volitional gaze shifts (Theeuwes et al 1998). The question also 
then arises as to the effect of admitting only a single object instance (and therefore type) into 
the list head, which are considered further in section 9.2. 
8.4   Endogenous attention 
We define endogenous attention here to be that which is directed to performing some task 
imposed by the cognitive layer. It is a form of overt visual attention, in that it is mediated by 
manipulation of ranking within the object preference list. Endogenous attention is classically 
investigated as a visual search task, in which participants are asked to search an image for an 
embedded specific but known target (e.g. Treisman and Gelade 1980, Wolfe 1994); or to 
identify “the odd one out” from a set of otherwise identical targets as quickly as possible. 
Exemplar tasks are shown in figure 5 (after Wolfe 1994). 
 
 
Figure 5: Search tasks – find the “odd one out” 
 
Where these characterizing features for the different target types are distinct at the 
peripheral resolution, attention and hence gaze, may be directed immediately
12. Typically, on 
the left hand test, the desired item is reported almost immediately, gaze saccades to the 
correct place with little hesitation and search time is broadly independent of the number of 
test items. It might be argued that the differences in the target to background items are 
sufficiently large to register at the peri-fovial resolution and attention may therefore be 
directed to the target immediately. The effect is particularly marked when the target is a 
different colour to the background items.   
Where the characterizing features are not distinguishable at the peri-foveal or peripheral 
resolution (such as illustrated in figure 3, right), attention must be directed sequentially, such 
that the detailed foveal model is brought over the candidate targets in order and passed to the 
cognitive layer for detailed comparison (that is, as a semantic rather than visual properties 
comparison). On the right hand test of figure 5, saccades show a marked (self-terminating) 
searching strategy, and search time rises linearly with the number of items presented.  
This may be characterized as a single object (two, if the target and distracter are both 
known), multiple instance task. Inhibition of return is spread over the number of instances, 
                                                      
12 This is the “pop-up” effect, which is frequently observed when a single distinct (colour or simple 
shaped) item is embedded among several otherwise identical ones. We suggest that this effect is a form 
of exogenous attention (not all do, see, e.g. Mack and Rock 1998), with a special purpose mechanism 
within the perceptual layer directing overt attention, which we do not model here.      
 21 allowing each to be visited in turn. Depending on the complexity of the task, each may be 
passed to the cognitive level for evaluation. Once the target is encountered the attentional 
preference list may revert to its default and the task is complete. 
Several things are clear from this. First, attention remains directed to the task, as other 
items in peripheral vision are not visited. Second, it clearly demonstrates that inhibition of 
return is not applied directly to the feature detector, or to any particular area of the image 
plane. These tasks are contrived, but Wolfe (1994) suggests they are also indicative of the 
process when applied to more naturalistic tasks.   
8.5  Worked example  
This section primarily illustrates the effects of exogenous attention ordering through a 
detailed worked example. For simplicity we will assume that the objects have been (correctly) 
hypothesised during the peripheral recognition phase described above. To aid the calculations, 
and make the effects of each change clearer, only a small sub-set of possible object features 
will be considered. The agent will scan over (overtly attend to) the objects in various orders, 
reflecting changing attentional priorities arising from: (i) The default information content 
(distinctiveness) based ordering, (ii) an ordering in which a subset of objects in Σo is 
advantaged by (artificially) increasing the relative strengths of the dv values of all their 
constituent features, thereby changing the preference order P (section 7.1) and (iii) Task or 
activity imposed orderings (section 5). 
This scheme is achieved by defining a significance multiplier function (sm()) associated 
with each feature type, such that all dv(F) terms in Appendix Two section A2.2 are 
substituted by (dv(F)*sm(F,n)).  
When applied with sm(), values of n > 1 enhance the attentive properties of the feature 
type F; n < 1 suppress it. Raising any dv value in this way consequently raises the preference 
order ranking of each object in which the feature appears. This raises the priority of the object 
model and it will be preferentially projected into Δh for corroboration. If corroborated, the ev 
value of the object is also increased. Its place in the attention prioritisation is thereby raised. 
This is exogenous, data driven attention, analogous to the Itti and Koch model. 
Next, consider the effect of the function attendobject(O, n), enhancing the distinctiveness 
values (dv) of all features of an inferred object by the significance multiplier. A high level 
cognitive system may now select from any of the object descriptions those that are to be 
considered relevant to its immediate task. Detection of any of the features implied by the 
object definition and passed upwards via the abductive step now contributes to the enhanced 
ranking. The greater the multiplying factor, the higher the ranking given equivalent evidence. 
This pre-disposes the system to select this model on the basis of weaker evidence than it 
would otherwise.  
A small sub-set of feature points from each object definition is selected here and a dv 
value calculated for each resulting type (Table 1). These feature points serve as “fixation” 
points in the emulation. The emulation calculates the object and feature distinctiveness values 
and preference orders according to the attention criteria stipulated. The resulting path 
orderings plotted and overlaid on the (greyed) original image for presentation in Figure 4.  
Figure 5a (top-left) shows the “default” gaze preference order, based on the distinctiveness 
values computed for each of the five objects (Pafpref = <Cat, Singer, Triceratops, Stegosaurus, 
Frog>). In each case we elect to expand the object into its sub-parts for detailed inspection 
(steps 2.1-2.6, section 7.2). The gaze order within each object is determined by the computed 
distinctiveness value of the individual feature types for that object. This order may change 
between examples as it depends in the relative effects of sm on each of the features, as 
described later in this section. In this simplified model the secondary attention order (section 
8.2) is also given by the remaining items in the preference list. Covert attention is not 
considered here. 
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Figure 5a-d: Software emulated gaze patterns 
 
The computed measures used to determine the order in which features and objects are 
visually scanned is given in Table 1. The columns give the name of the feature/object, its 
Type and dv(Type) value, and the ordering for the four images shown in figures 5a to 5d. 
Empty order cells indicate features that are (self-) occluded or absent.  Note the change in the 
computed ordering between the features in figures 5a and 5b. In this case (and as explained in 
the text) arising here from a change of saliency, compared with the change in the order in 
which objects are attended to, but where the search order of features within the same object 
remain unchanged, as when comparing the simulated scanpaths in figures 5a and 5c. 
Figure 5b (top-right) shows the gaze order where the feature type distinctiveness value for 
feature types plate and horn in the two dinosaur (these feature types being typical of 
“dinosaurs” in this restricted world) definitions has been multiplied by a sm constant factor 
(x10), so as to guarantee they are raised to the front of the preference list: (Pbfpref = 
<Triceratops, Stegosaurus, Cat, Singer, Frog>). Note that the feature visit order in the selected 
dinosaur objects is identical to that of figure 5a (the default), but that the internal scan order 
of the other objects is changed as the modified dv values propagate through all object models. 
In the general case, because feature types are necessarily shared between types of objects, it is 
not possible to induce all possible object preference orders using this weighted feature 
approach. 
Figure 5c (bottom-left) shows a task based ordering based on an sm value of 10 for the 
singer and its effect on the gaze path. The preference order becomes (Pcfpref = <Singer, Cat, 
Frog, Stegosaurus, Triceratops >) with the singer attended first, as expected. 
Similarly, Figure 5d (bottom-right) shows an alternative attention ordering (Adfattend = < 
Stegosaurus, Cat, Singer, Frog>), based on the conditions described for figure 5b, illustrating 
the effect of a missing object type (O2) and occluded object sub-parts (f41 and f42 of O5, the 
cat). The preference list P is unaltered, but the attend list A only contains elements of the 
preference list supported by the evidence in the image. The feature scan order within each 
object is not affected between these latter two rankings as this is based on the original dv 
preference ordering.  
 
 23 Index Name Type dv(o) dv(Type) Ordering dv(o) dv(Type) Ordering dv(o) dv(Type) Ordering dv(o) dv(Type) Ordering
 o1 Stegasauros 0.14632 0.689095 2.431664 0.689095
1 f1 Eye 0.14632 0.006494 32 0.689095 0.006196 13 2.431664 0.899814 26 0.689095 0.006196 7
2 f2 Eye 0.14632 0.006494 0.689095 0.006196 2.431664 0.899814 0.689095 0.006196
3 f3 Foot 0.14632 0.012554 0.689095 0.012256 2.431664 0.142239 0.689095 0.012256 3
4 f4 Foot 0.14632 0.012554 29 0.689095 0.012256 10 2.431664 0.142239 27 0.689095 0.012256 4
5 f5 Foot 0.14632 0.012554 30 0.689095 0.012256 11 2.431664 0.142239 28 0.689095 0.012256 5
6 f6 Foot 0.14632 0.012554 31 0.689095 0.012256 12 2.431664 0.142239 29 0.689095 0.012256 6
7 f7 Tail 0.14632 0.027706 26 0.689095 0.027408 9 2.431664 0.021027 30 0.689095 0.027408 2
8 f8 Plate 0.14632 0.027706 27 0.689095 0.300135 7 2.431664 0.021027 31 0.689095 0.300135 1
9 f9 Plate 0.14632 0.027706 28 0.689095 0.300135 8 2.431664 0.021027 32 0.689095 0.300135
10 o2 Tricerotops 0.166667 0.166667 1.255491 1.255491 2.329004 2.329004 1.255491 1.255491
11 f10 Eye 0.166667 0.006494 25 1.255491 0.006196 6 2.329004 0.899814 1.255491 0.006196
12 f11 Eye 0.166667 0.006494 1.255491 0.006196 2.329004 0.899814 33 1.255491 0.006196
13 f12 Horn 0.166667 0.088312 20 1.255491 0.906196 1 2.329004 0.081633 36 1.255491 0.906196
14 f13 Plate 0.166667 0.027706 21 1.255491 0.300135 2 2.329004 0.021027 1.255491 0.300135
15 f14 Foot 0.166667 0.012554 1.255491 0.012256 2.329004 0.142239 37 1.255491 0.012256
16 f15 Foot 0.166667 0.012554 1.255491 0.012256 2.329004 0.142239 1.255491 0.012256
17 f16 Foot 0.166667 0.012554 23 1.255491 0.012256 4 2.329004 0.142239 34 1.255491 0.012256
18 f17 Foot 0.166667 0.012554 24 1.255491 0.012256 5 2.329004 0.142239 35 1.255491 0.012256
19 f18 Tail 0.166667 0.027706 22 1.255491 0.027408 3 2.329004 0.021027 38 1.255491 0.027408
20 o3 Singer 0.300433 0.300433 0.298051 0.298051 4.774273 4.774273 0.298051 0.298051
21 f19 Eye 0.300433 0.006494 18 0.298051 0.006196 31 4.774273 0.899814 1 0.298051 0.006196 22
22 f20 Eye 0.300433 0.006494 19 0.298051 0.006196 32 4.774273 0.899814 2 0.298051 0.006196 23
23 f21 Muzzle 0.300433 0.088312 10 0.298051 0.088014 23 4.774273 0.899814 3 0.298051 0.088014 15
24 f22 Lamp 0.300433 0.088312 11 0.298051 0.088014 24 4.774273 0.899814 4 0.298051 0.088014 16
25 f23 Hand 0.300433 0.042857 12 0.298051 0.042559 25 4.774273 0.445269 5 0.298051 0.042559 17
26 f24 Hand 0.300433 0.042857 13 0.298051 0.042559 26 4.774273 0.445269 6 0.298051 0.042559 18
27 f25 Foot 0.300433 0.012554 16 0.298051 0.012256 28 4.774273 0.142239 9 0.298051 0.012256 21
28 f26 Foot 0.300433 0.012554 17 0.298051 0.012256 30 4.774273 0.142239 10 0.298051 0.012256
29 f27 Mouth 0.300433 0.027706 15 0.298051 0.027408 28 4.774273 0.293754 8 0.298051 0.027408 20
30 f28 Nose 0.300433 0.042857 14 0.298051 0.042559 27 4.774273 0.445269 7 0.298051 0.042559 19
31 o4 Frog 0.090909 0.090909 0.088825 0.088825 2.662338 2.662338 0.088825 0.088825
32 f29 Eye 0.090909 0.006494 37 0.088825 0.006196 37 2.662338 0.899814 20 0.088825 0.006196 29
33 f30 Eye 0.090909 0.006494 38 0.088825 0.006196 38 2.662338 0.899814 21 0.088825 0.006196 30
34 f31 Mouth 0.090909 0.027706 33 0.088825 0.027408 33 2.662338 0.293754 22 0.088825 0.027408 24
35 f32 Foot 0.090909 0.012554 34 0.088825 0.012256 34 2.662338 0.142239 23 0.088825 0.012256 25
36 f33 Foot 0.090909 0.012554 35 0.088825 0.012256 35 2.662338 0.142239 24 0.088825 0.012256 26
37 f34 Foot 0.090909 0.012554 36 0.088825 0.012256 36 2.662338 0.142239 25 0.088825 0.012256 27
38 f35 Foot 0.090909 0.012554 0.088825 0.012256 2.662338 0.142239 0.088825 0.012256 28
39 o5 Cat 0.31039 0.31039 0.307412 0.307412 3.816327 3.816327 0.307412 0.307412
40 f36 Eye 0.31039 0.006494 8 0.307412 0.006196 21 3.816327 0.899814 11 0.307412 0.006196 13
41 f37 Eye 0.31039 0.006494 9 0.307412 0.006196 22 3.816327 0.899814 12 0.307412 0.006196 14
42 f38 Ear 0.31039 0.042857 2 0.307412 0.042559 15 3.816327 0.445269 13 0.307412 0.042559 9
43 f39 Ear 0.31039 0.042857 3 0.307412 0.042559 16 3.816327 0.445269 14 0.307412 0.042559 10
44 f40 Leg-join 0.31039 0.088312 1 0.307412 0.088014 14 3.816327 0.081633 19 0.307412 0.088014 8
45 f41 Foot 0.31039 0.012554 6 0.307412 0.012256 19 3.816327 0.142239 17 0.307412 0.012256
46 f44 Foot 0.31039 0.012554 7 0.307412 0.012256 20 3.816327 0.142239 18 0.307412 0.012256
47 f45 Tail 0.31039 0.027706 0.307412 0.027408 3.816327 0.021027 0.307412 0.027408
48 f46 Mouth 0.31039 0.027706 5 0.307412 0.027408 18 3.816327 0.293754 16 0.307412 0.027408 12
49 f47 Nose 0.31039 0.042857 4 0.307412 0.042559 17 3.816327 0.445269 15 0.307412 0.042559 11
Figure 5d Figre 5a Figure 5b Figure 5c
 
Table 1:  Example tabulated output values for the objects and features depicted in Figures 5a-d. 
 
Human eye-gaze paths have a notable tendency to concentrate on facial representations 
where they appear. These are revisited frequently, even where they are largely devoid of 
apparent features (see Figure 1, top right). We might conjecture that the human brain has 
evolved to differentially attend to these most salient of areas and will record and search for 
distinguishing features as a priority. An artificial perceptual system might similarly represent 
facial areas with a high density of feature detail, and artificially raise the salience of these 
types of features.  
It is clear that a single fixation (glance) at an object within the greater foveal area is 
sufficient for immediate recognition, so the question arises as to why human gaze returns to a 
face (or any object) for detailed inspection with the fovea centralis? We might conjecture that 
these periods of detailed inspection are related to the building and on-going maintenance of 
the feature cloud description, making small adjustments and improvements to the 
representation. 
9   Modes of Inattention 
The next two sub-sections discuss some interesting apparent lapses in attention. As with much 
of the human perceptual process, such lapses and anomalies can be highly informative, 
identifying underlying mechanisms where they were previously hidden from investigative 
view. Two classes of inattentional lapse have been subject to much experimental investigation 
recently, change blindness (e.g. Simons and Rensink 2005 for review) and inattentional 
blindness (Mack and Rock 1998). Each is described briefly, and discussed in the context of 
the abductive perception and attention model. There may be other modes of inattention, but 
we are, as yet, blind to them. 
 24 9.1   Change Blindness 
The phenomenon of “change blindness” (CB) refers to instances where changes in a visual 
scene, which would normally be expected to initiate a shift of attention are ignored, with the 
observer apparently unaware that the visual change occurred. There are several related 
effects, which will be broadly characterized here according to the timescale over which they 
occur. We will consider two such ranges, one operating over a time range commensurate with 
a saccade and fixation (~300ms), the equivalent of one perceptual cycle, and another where 
the changes are measured in seconds. Each is demonstrated with a range of ingenious 
experiments.  
It has been widely reported that significant changes to an otherwise static image that occur 
during even brief periods of visual disruption are substantially less likely to be reported. Such 
disruptions can arise as a natural consequence of the human visual system, such as a blink 
(O’Regan  et al 2000) or saccade (Blackmore et al 1995, Grimes 1996), or can be 
experimentally induced by interrupting the image field briefly.  
The flicker paradigm (Rensink et al 1997) illustrates this. Participants are shown an image 
that changes in some semantically material respect (i.e. a significant object has been added or 
removed by photo-manipulation), but where this change is made during a brief period (e.g. 
80ms) when the image is replaced by a neutral (grey) or patterned disrupter field. Without the 
disruption changes are noticed readily, but this falls dramatically when disruption is 
introduced. The original and altered images may be shown alternately for an extended period, 
with each transition masked by the disruption, until the change is reported or the experiment 
ends.  
Given that we have proposed a working memory structure, Δp, it is reasonable to question 
whether change is detected by a direct and immediate comparison of current object type (in 
Δi) and the immediately preceding object type (in Δp) at the equivalent location. Both 
representations co-exist at step 10 of the perceptual process (section 6) and comparisons are 
possible then. If a comparison is to be made, then it is only made between immediately 
consecutive object types at any given location in Δp. This is consistent with the data for the 
flicker experiments. If the change is made between successive image “frames” the change is 
detected, any disrupter event swamping the attention mechanism with multiple changes.  
The notion of a visual memory in humans is contentious (e.g. Simons and Rensink 2005). 
Wolfe (1999) has dubbed the change blindness phenomena inattentional amnesia, on the 
presumption that these changes are not noted because no memory has been retained of the 
visual stimuli, so no comparison might be made: “visual representation has no memory. It 
exists solely in the present ...”. In one sense, this appears largely so, the immediate veridical 
sensation of sight disappears immediately the eye or imager is obscured – as Δi is lost. The 
idea that such a structure might exist within the human perceptual system to build a composite 
visual scene over several saccade/fixation pairings is also largely unsupported by 
experimental evidence (Hollingworth and Henderson 2002). Hollingworth et al (2001) have 
reported that changes are predominantly detected only at or near the fixation point. This is 
commensurate with the notion that change detection under these circumstances is the 
prerogative of comparison at the conceptual level, the current overtly attended item and a 
previously recorded one. Given that changes are sometimes noted outside the foveal area, 
secondary items presumably share this property as well.  
However, experiments in which seemingly large changes were made to an image, but 
gradually over an extended time period (10+ seconds), say to the colour of a prominent object 
or by the gradual introduction/removal of an object, are also largely ignored (e.g. Simons et al 
2000). It appears from these and similar image change experiments that human perception 
relies heavily on specialized rate of change detectors to draw attention to change and that 
these may be strongly biased to luminance rather than colour change (Theeuwes 1995). Such 
change detectors can only reasonably function during fixations and are not activated when the 
rate of change in the stimulus is low, and are apparently reset by blink or saccadic image 
motion or where their operation is disrupted by masking (Blackmore et al 1995), when no 
 25 attention is triggered and gaze shift not precipitated. Change detection under normal (i.e. 
uninterrupted) circumstances is therefore a form of exogenous attention.  
This appears consistent with mudsplash experiments (e.g. O’Regan et al 1999), in which 
an uninterrupted salient object change is made – which would normally be noticed – but 
which is simultaneously accompanied by a flashed “mudsplash”, an irregular area of high 
visual contrast. Noticing of the semantic change is greatly inhibited, the exogenous (change) 
attention mechanism having directed the overt locus of attention to the mudsplash area.  
In the seminal long timescale CB experiment described by Simons and Levin (1998), a 
passer-by was approached by the experimenter and asked for directions. During the reply, two 
“workmen” carrying a door passed between the two and the conversation continued. On 
questioning approximately half the participants reported that they had not noticed that the 
experimenter had been exchanged for another (not particularly similar) person during the 
interruption. Low rates of noticing have also been reported for film clips in which actors are 
substituted or objects change between scene cuts (Levin and Simons 1997).  
A conceptual or object level memory of recently attended items passed to the cognitive 
layer at least serves to explain those instances where changes are noticed, change blindness is 
by no means an absolute or inevitable phenomena. Simons and Levin (1998) reported that 
levels of noticing varied greatly. It might be argued, therefore, that the level of abstraction of 
items attended to and reported is high, but not uniform. Matching is type to type, recording 
only that it was of type “face” guarantees an inability to detect the substitution, while a record 
of hair colour or other facial characteristics recorded from the object model enables, though 
does not guarantee, change detection.  
The question remains as to why human perception apparently relies so little on visual 
memory – and whether a robot should do likewise. Change is endemic in visual scenes. To 
compare details in the current scene with preceding ones invites a flood of items for attention 
and explanation, so reliance on the immediate interpretation remains the appropriate option 
unless there are specific, task related, reasons for doing otherwise.   
9.2   Inattentional Blindness 
Inattentional Blindness is wittily demonstrated in a classic experiment due to Simons and 
Chabris (1999), in which participants are required to attend to a demanding task of counting 
the number of ball passes between members of a basketball team. In attending closely to the 
task, a significant proportion of viewers fail to note the appearance of an actor dressed in a 
gorilla costume, walk slowly across the scene, stopping centre stage to beat his chest. The 
effect may also be achieved under laboratory conditions with synthetic images (Most et al 
2000), in which an otherwise highly prominent distracter pattern is ignored while conducting 
a demanding attentional task.    
These tasks are characterized by a high attentive load to a single or small number of items, 
a single instance of the ball object in Simons and Chabris (1999). They are appropriately 
modelled by very short or single item list heads. Under these conditions both competing 
objects, which would normally be easily attended to, and all but the most salient exogenous 
events are excluded from the attention process. Inhibition of return is suspended – with only 
one item in the list head the IOR mechanism is effectively undefined. The secondary attention 
mechanism is, by definition, unavailable – a form of attentional (as opposed to physiological) 
“tunnel vision”. Equally, as there is no pre-attentive item, inter-object saccades are suppressed 
and eye movements adopt a pursuit strategy, tracking the single remaining attentive item. 
Under this interpretation, the phenomena might be better described as hyper-attentional 
neglect, as no other objects but those stipulated by the experimenter and attended to by the 
participant are considered for the duration of the trial. 
10   Summary and Conclusions 
We have presented a description of our formally described, if largely theoretical, approach to 
robot perception and attention based on ideas of abductive and deductive reasoning (section 
2) coupled to a feature cloud representation of object models. We have focussed on the notion 
 26 of a visual object, embodied in space and represented as a feature cloud (section 3), which 
gives rise to specific and distinctive effects on feature detectors (section 4). We describe a 
perceptual process (section 6) that creates hypotheses (Δh and Δi) to “explain” the visual 
sensor data in terms of individual feature cloud object models (individually represented in 
Σo). This process is guided by several measures (appendix 2) derived from the semantics of 
the object definitions. We define a form of transient object memory (section 5) that serves 
several roles, including inhibition of return. We assume a foveal imaging system, which 
restricts accurate identification of objects to the centre of the visual image field, but allows 
partial hypotheses to be formed in the periphery. One aspect of attention defines how the 
fovea is directed to different objects to serialize the perceptual process, the scanpath. 
This is the basis of the attentional process model (section 7), in which object preferences 
or predispositions (section 7.1) are used to order the importance or salience of objects and so 
define how they will be visited (section 7.2). We briefly discuss the management of such 
preference orderings (section 7.3). The resulting system is intended to isolate aspects of 
perception and attention that are germane to an artificial or robot model. Each design stage 
has been inspired by biological (primarily human) considerations, but it is not principally a 
model of human attention. Rather it is an artifice that shares many properties with the system 
it is based on, but which does not seek to emulate it exactly.  
This has then been used to motivate a discussion of how small modifications in the 
management of these preference orderings, coupled to notions of inhibition of return and a 
partial memory model, can be used to emulate within the artifice a range of both attention and 
inattention phenomena (section 9) experimentally observed in the human perceptual system 
(section 8).  
We consider six such attention related phenomena. First, the foveal scanpath (section 8.1), 
autonomic control of eye movements to model notions of overt attention. Second, notions of 
covert attention (section 8.2), recognising that we may be aware of more items than just the 
item of overt attention. Third, exogenous attention (section 8.3), the role of sensor-based 
events to capture the attention mechanism and direct it independently of autonomic (or 
volitional) gaze movements. Fourth, endogenous attention (section 8.4), the role of task 
directed attention to direct the scanpath according to the requirements of a cognitive control 
layer. Fifth, change blindness, a range of situations in which the attentional system apparently 
demonstrates unexpected lapses of attention, using the model to discuss how this might be 
approached. In section 9, we briefly considered inattentional blindness, where seemingly 
highly conspicuous visual events are unexpectedly ignored due to “hyper” attention to one 
item. 
Our computationally motivated model and discussion here can only engage a sub-set of the 
plethora of individual phenomena that make up the total animal and human attentional 
system. We hope that it will act as a catalyst and framework to consider attention as a 
complex, but highly coordinated bridge between the underlying perceptual systems, both 
informing and being informed by cognitive control centres. The use of eye-gaze scanpath 
strategies, largely assumed here, are not conducive to ready analysis and are largely avoided 
by the psychological attention community, who prefer to concentrate on highly controlled 
experimental conditions and quantitative measures of performance, such as response time, to 
conduct their research. While precise in their individual measurements it is often hard to 
relate the findings under these highly artificial conditions back to the consequences for a 
broader view of the attentional processes as they might be applied in the synthesis of an 
artificial model for robot control or to gain an overall understanding of the human attentional 
system (Sutherland 1998, for instance).   
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 27 Appendix One: Representing Preferences 
In this appendix we establish a formal notion of preference ordering defined on a set of types, 
Type1,Type2,…,Typen-1,Typen. Let f be a reflexive, transitive relation over a set of types 
encoded in ΣO. Then we say α is preferred to β with respect to (wrt) criterion φ, α fφ β if and 
only if wrt to φ, α is greater than or equal to β. For example, in the case where φ is taken as 
the dv measure, then: α fdv β ≡ dv(α) > dv(β). Strict and equal preferences are respectively 
defined as follows:  
 
α fφ β ≡ α fφ β & ¬(β f φ α)  
α fφ β ≡ α fφ  β & β fφ  α 
 
The relations fφ and fφ, respectively define a total and partial ordering over the type 
values. We now wish to define a total ordering of type elements and sets of types: 
<S1,S2,...,Sn-1,Sn>, the elements of each set having equal preference and whose elements 
between each Si and Si+1 indexed set mean that all the elements of Si+1 are strictly preferred to 
the elements of Si, thus: 
 
Sfφ  = <S1,S2,...,Sn-1,Sn> 
where: ∀αi∈Si, ∀αj∈ Sj   (αi fφ αj ) and ∀αi∈Si, ∀αj∈ Si  (αi fφ αj ) 
 
For example, given: Sfφ = <O1,{O2,O3},O4>, shall be interpreted to mean that wrt φ, O1 is 
strictly preferred over O2 and O3, with these strictly preferred to O4. In the case where an 
arbitrary preference order is imposed on the elements of S (independent of their respective dv 
values) this will be denoted as: Sfα, where α is some indexed property. While not necessarily 
the case, the indexing property used (e.g. α) may be a real number ordering. By convention 
here, higher positive values will indicate a greater degree of preference. 
Appendix Two: Definitions of Measures 
In this appendix we define the three functions: dv(Type),  ro(Type) and ev(x,v) used to 
compute the degree to which any hypothesized object, x, as seen from viewpoint v, explains 
and predicts currently available sensor data. In each case, we measure symbolic information 
encoded in wffs and in particular encoded in wffs of the form: Object(xi,vi,Typei,...), 
Feature(fi,vi,Typei,…), and Appearance(a,v,Type,...) in the logical formalism used. Here, in 
the interest of brevity, we simply give a brief description of these functions and how they are 
used. For a full description see (Randell and Witkowski 2006). 
A2.1   Distinctiveness Value 
The distinctiveness value of a feature Type:  dv(Type) measures the proportion of feature 
instances of type, Type, encoded within the objects in ΣO against all the features of any type, 
also encoded in ΣO.  This is an a priori measure of the rarity of the feature type. Formally, we 
are measuring the proportion of individual feature variables f1,...,fn, of a given Type, encoded 
in ΣO (i.e. in wffs of the form: Feature(fi,vi,Type,…)) against feature variables of any feature 
type. Let S(F)={fi|Feature(fi,v,F,[...])∈Σo}, and S={fi|Feature(fi,…)∈Σo}, and let |S| denote 
the cardinality of set S.  Then dv(F) = 1 –  (|S(F)| / |S|). The distinctiveness of an object or 
object-part is derived by propagation from the calculated values of its features (section 4). 
A2.2   Explanatory Value 
The explanatory value (ev), the degree to which a specific hypothesized object o in Δi is 
supported by the sensor data, is defined as: 
 
  ev(o) = (P+Q)–(R+S) / (P+Q+R+S);  -1≤  ev(o) ≤ 1 
 
where: 
 P=  [Σ |{fi}| × dv(Φ): [Feature(fi,…, Φ,…) &  Expected(fi,v0) & Detected(fi,v0)]] 
 Q=  [Σ |{fi}| × dv(Φ): [Feature(fi,…, Φ,…) & ¬Expected(fi,v0) & ¬Detected(fi,v0)]] 
 28  R=  [Σ |{fi}| × dv(Φ): [Feature(fi,…, Φ,…) & Expected(fi,v0) & ¬Detected(fi,v0)]] 
 S=  [Σ |{fi}| × dv(Φ): [Feature(fi,…, Φ,…) & ¬Expected(fi,v0) & Detected(fi,v0)]] 
 
Here P represents the sum of instances where a feature (fi of type Φ) is Expected in the 
object hypothesis projection and is matched (by both type and location) by a Detected 
observation in the sensor data stream. Q denotes the expectation of no feature coupled to no 
data.  R denotes an expectation unmatched by a corresponding feature and S sensor data 
detected without any matching expectation. P and Q support the hypothesis (tending to +1); R 
and  S tend to refutation (tending to -1). P,  Q,  R and S are weighted according to the 
distinctiveness (dv) of the expected feature, providing a partial ordering of significance. 
A2.3   Rank Order 
The remaining measure rank order ro(Type) measures the a posteriori likelihood that object x 
of type Type defined in ΣO causally explains the available sensor data in Γ. Rank order 
measures the number of possible substitutions (of terms for variables in wffs) that match 
interpreted sensor data items to individual features in ΣO, Type for Type. It is the ratio of all 
features of the object that have a corresponding appearance in Γ (Ω) to all the features of the 
matched object (Ξ).  
 
      ro(Object) =  
             Σ  |{fi}|× dv(Fi): [Feature(fi,…,Fi,…)& Ω ] 
  Σ  |{fj}|× dv(Fj): [Feature(fj,… ,Fj,…)& Ξ ] 
 
This process is restricted so that at most one interpreted feature fi belonging to an object 
definition x, is matched to exactly one appearance of that feature detected in the sensor data 
stream Γ. Note the features are weighted by their distinctiveness here. 
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